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Abstract 
 
Woman-owned firms engage differently with finance for trade. The barriers they face in 
starting and running a business are well-known. Yet, this offers little insight into how they 
finance their business once globalized. Surveys indicate that finance is often the primary 
barrier to trade. We seek to deepen and modernize this finding by using a unique data set to 
explore the patterns of financial access exhibited by woman-owned exporting firms. We 
show that women face two levels of exclusion in access to finance—access to basic finance 
and access to trade finance. The latter is driven by characteristics common to firms owned 
by women. Also, in line with existing work, we show that woman-owned firms tend to turn to 
informal finance as an alternative more than their male counterparts. However, we also show 
that women are more likely to adopt fintech as a financial solution than men. This suggests 
that policies aimed at incentivizing banks to lend more to women may not be solving the right 
problem. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Does the gender of an exporter affect her ability to secure finance for trade? Lately the 
policy spotlight has turned to the difficulties small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) face in entering and thriving in cross-border trade (see, for example, ITC 2016; 
WTO 2016). Since woman-owned firms fall disproportionately into this size category, 
this raises questions about the potential impact of gender.  
SMEs consistently report access to finance as their main constraint to growth and 
trade. And supply-side evidence confirms that financial institutions are more likely to 
transact with large firms. This stems from the characteristics of SMEs – specifically, 
they apply for low volumes of finance, they are less likely to have sophisticated 
financial documentation, and they often lack access to collateral. Together, these make 
it difficult for financial institutions to profitably assess risk and offer finance to SMEs.  
The lack of access to capital occurs—as we will show—at two levels. The first is the 
basic banking relationship. SMEs report much lower levels of banking engagement and 
basic loans than larger firms. The second is access to trade finance. Even after SMEs 
have secured a banking relationship, data show that they are more likely to be denied 
trade finance than other firms. This is problematic from a policy perspective because 
securing a loan from a bank solves the problem of basic financial access, but if 
exclusion re-emerges when the firm is ready to seek export finance, then we need to 
consider other interventions. 
Increasingly, policy makers have looked towards the rise of fintech as a potential 
solution to the finance gap for SMEs. Fintech providers tend to target SMEs and some 
specifically target exporters. Yet research-based evidence that fintech can solve the 
finance gap for SMEs is still only in the initial stages. There is growing analysis on the 
supply side of fintech, but there is less on the borrower side. 
We extend the literature on SME access to finance by looking in particular at the case 
of woman-owned firms. Globally, only 10.1% of all formal-sector firms are led by 
women. We know very little about this population. Partly, this is a result of data 
collection and specification issues.1 But it also reflects a lack of attention to export 
finance in the broader access-to-finance discussion. 
The question of gender-specific engagement in trade finance is a particularly important 
question for Asia and the Pacific where only 3% of firms are led by women.  
To the extent that gender has entered the discussion about finance and trade, the 
focus has been almost exclusively on informal firms (e.g., Shepherd and Stone 2017). 
This makes it difficult to extrapolate how gender impacts firms that operate in the 
formal and exporting sectors.  
To explore whether woman-owned firms that export exhibit different access and usage 
patterns in trade finance, we focus on two questions. Each introduces additional 
nuance to the existing story about the challenges facing, and behaviors exhibited by, 
woman-led firms that trade.  
First: Is there a gender differential in patterns of access to finance? We look at both 
access to basic finance and access to trade finance, and confirm that women face 
different barriers that result in lower access.  
1  See Presbitero et al. (2014) for a discussion about the tricky issue of how to define a “woman-led firm,” 
for example. 
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The second question is: When woman-owned firms are rejected for trade finance, do 
they secure alternative capital through the emerging fintech channel? This question 
allows us to explore the issue of how technology impacts trade finance access by 
underserved firms.  
Our data show that woman-owned firms are securing fintech as an alternative source 
of capital, though the actual volume of credit is very low. This offers a counterpoint to 
the literature on the gender digital divide and has implications for national policies 
aimed at promoting lending to small firms and women. It is of particular relevance to 
countries in Asia and Africa, where the uptake of informal finance is particularly high 
among women, and fintech may offer an attractive alternative. 
2. MOTIVATION AND A WORD ABOUT THE GENDER 
DIGITAL DIVIDE  
This study was originally motivated by a particular finding in the 2016 Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) survey of 791 trading firms. In line with existing evidence, 
woman-led firms involved in cross-border trade are smaller, less profitable, and report 
greater difficulties securing finance than the general population of trading firms. Yet, 
when asked about their use of fintech, women-led trading firms report much higher 
uptake rates than the general population. This goes very much against what we know 
about the gender digital divide.  
Globally, the gender digital divide represents the additional barriers women face in 
accessing and using technology. It stems from a number of factors including control of 
resources, social norms, a lack of digital literacy, and access to the Internet and mobile 
phones (see, for example, GSMA 2015). The fact that this digital divide is not reflected 
in rates of uptake of fintech, which often has digital components, is surprising.  
On top of this, additional barriers to fintech faced by women include a lack of financial 
identification documents, lower financial independence, less financial literacy, greater 
risk aversion (Powell and Ansic 1997), and sociocultural norms preventing women from 
accessing financial services (Ongena and Popov 2016). 
Evidence tells us that the drivers of the gender gap in the credit market may be rooted 
in firm characteristics (Arrow 1973) or lender preferences (Becker 1957). Loan 
requests from small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are more often rationed as 
a consequence of low company ratings and insufficient collateral. More importantly, it 
has generally been found that woman-owned firms are less likely to obtain finance and 
more likely to pay higher interest rates than their male-owned peers (Muravyev et al. 
2009; Alesina et al. 2013; Presbitero et al. 2014). Such challenges also apply to trade 
finance.  
Fintech encompasses a wide variety of financial instruments related to financial 
technology. In the context of this paper, we adopt the general definition of fintech as 
providers of capital that use digital platforms. Examples include peer-to-peer (P2P) 
lending and crowdfunding (see BIS 2017 for additional detail). 
The differences between bank finance and fintech can be established by looking briefly 
at P2P lending. P2P lending involves an online platform where individuals can post 
information to attract unsecured direct loans from lenders without the intermediation  
of any financial institution. The platform allows borrowers to post their loan requests 
and lenders to search for requests linked to their interests. Lenders and borrowers  
are largely matched on their own, not through a formal intermediary. The intermediary 
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is the online lending website, which records transaction data that can be used for 
analysis. These online platforms lower transaction costs, which increases the feasibility 
of making microloans. Borrowers can combine numerous small loans to fund larger 
projects. 
This lending model incorporates information asymmetry between lenders and 
borrowers. To mitigate this, the online platforms require online authentication and allow 
borrowers to demonstrate their creditworthiness through disclosing their financial and 
personal information to develop trust between the users (Chen et al. 2016; Feng et al. 
2015).  
The first online P2P lending platform, Zopa, was established in the UK in 2005. Since 
then, the model has experienced significant growth in many other countries such as the 
US, Denmark, Japan, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Feng et al. 2015). In 
2016, lending in the P2P market resulted in more than $4 billion (Flynt 2016).  
Table 1: Comparison of P2P Lending and Traditional Loan Financing 
Major Differences P2P Lending Traditional Loan Financing 
Interest Rate Low-Medium Medium-High 
Loan Amount High Low 
Collateral/Endorsement Yes No 
Party Involved Borrower, Bank Borrower, Lender, Platform 
Regulation/Supervision Strict Loose 
Process Complex, Long Simple, Fast 
Risk Low High 
Transaction Cost High Low 
Source: Feng, Fan, and Yoon (2015). 
The relationship between fintech and traditional trade finance is evolving. While a 
recent ADB report shows that about 38% of fintech users also use trade finance (ADB 
2017), this does not appear to be competing with bank-intermediated trade finance. In 
fact, the 2017 ICC Banking Commission survey reports that only 1.4% of banks felt that 
fintechs were a threat to their position as providers of trade finance (ICC 2017).  
3. ACCESS TO FINANCE FOR TRADE: TRADITIONAL, 
INFORMAL, AND FINTECH 
Empirical evidence has consistently shown that SMEs are excluded from traditional 
financial channels. This makes it difficult for them to access the capital they need to 
increase employment and production, and grow their firms. It is also understood that 
woman-owned firms face these plus additional barriers related to ownership of capital 
and childcare that even among the excluded population of SMEs make access to 
finance more difficult.  
The literature on access to credit by woman-owned firms tends to focus on 
entrepreneurs or micro-sized firms (e.g., Alesina et al. 2013; Brana 2013). These firms 
face credit constraints but not higher interest rates once they have obtained credit 
(Asiedu et al. 2013; Bellucci et al. 2010). 
Our data confirm that woman-led firms lack access to basic banking services that are 
needed to grow their firms. In this section, we go that one step further to show that 
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even after woman-led firms secure banking access and typical financial instruments 
like working capital, they face a second level of exclusion. This occurs when they have 
begun to export and apply for trade finance. Among SMEs that apply for trade finance, 
woman-owned firms are more likely to be rejected (Table 4).  
There is one important caveat to these levels of exclusion – the data do not show  
that financial institutions are gender-discriminating. There is no evidence that banks  
are rejecting woman-owned firms because they are owned by women. Rather, the  
full effect is the result of firm characteristics of woman-owned firms.2 This is in line  
with findings on productivity differences between male- and woman-owned firms.  
The literature shows that these are the result of unequal access to productive 
resources (see, for example, Blackden and Hallward-Driemeier 2013). Now we turn to 
the empirics.  
To explore the existence of a gender gap in trade finance, we use two sources of data. 
One is the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) over the period 2006–2016, which 
cover indicators assessing firms’ bank accounts, credit lines, and loan requirements, 
among other indicators. While the surveys do not explicitly refer to access to trade 
finance, we use exporters’ applications for normal finance as a proxy.  
The other is the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Company Survey on Trade Finance, 
which has endeavored to identify trade finance gaps since 2014. The survey captures 
firm characteristics, hindrances to trade finance, and firm behavior when seeking 
alternative financing instruments. Each wave of the survey has a unique population, 
and questions related to gender are included in the 2016 and 2017 surveys. Therefore, 
our analysis will focus on these survey years. 
3.1 Exclusion Level I: Access to Basic Financial Services 
The World Bank Enterprise Surveys collect detailed information on firm performance, 
demand for financing, and firms’ relationship with banks. The sample includes 
exporters of all sizes from 139 countries. Of these firms, 24% report the participation of 
at least one women in the ownership structure. An additional 7% are female-owned, in 
which all or the majority of the owners are women. We include both categories in the 
analysis as “woman-owned.” 
Table 2 compares the characteristics of women- and male-owned businesses. Woman-
owned firms (WOFs) are more likely to be small-sized and trade-dependent. Among 
small firms, the proportion owned by women is twice that of their male counterparts. 
Direct exports account for 53% of sales among woman-owned exporters, which is 6% 
higher than male-owned firms. Some 39% of companies applied for lines of credit or 
loans. There were no pronounced differences between ownership categories in the 
outcome of their applications. For nonapplicants, the main reason lies in unfavorable 
interest rates. But the two groups view their constraints differently, e.g., more WOFs 
regard high collateral requirements as the major barrier.  
  
2  This does not mean that there are no cases where bank officers gender-discriminate. However, for the 
global data set the effects are absorbed by firm characteristics. 
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Table 2: Comparison of Firm Characteristics  
  Mean 
Variables Definition 
Full 
Sample 
Male-
owned 
Female-
owned Difference 
Firm Characteristics     
dexport Direct exports as % of sales 43.22 46.19 52.64 *** 
logsale Log form of annual sales in the last year 17.98 17.88 16.96 *** 
small # employees < 20 0.19 0.23 0.39 *** 
medium # employees 20–99 0.35 0.35 0.37  
large # employees 100 and over 0.46 0.42 0.25 *** 
Demand for Credit     
apply if applied for lines of credit or loans 0.40 0.66 0.63  
rationed If the application for credit was rejected 0.04 0.04 0.04  
Reasons for not applying for loans     
noneed No need for loans 0.68 0.66 0.63  
complexity Complex application procedure 0.06 0.07 0.07  
price Unfavorable interest rates 0.11 0.12 0.14  
collateral Collateral requirements were too high 0.05 0.05 0.09 *** 
maturity Insufficient loan size and maturity 0.02 0.03 0.01 * 
discouraged Did not think it would be approved 0.02 0.02 0.02  
Relationship with the bank     
overdraft if the firm has an overdraft facility 0.59 0.55 0.43 *** 
line if the firm has a line of credit or a loan 
from a financial institution 
0.53 0.43 0.38 ** 
% Working capital funded by     
internal Internal funds or retained earnings 62.94 65.46 63.71  
banks Private and stated-owned banks 19.32 19.36 16.34 *** 
fins Financial institutions 1.79 2.25 3.28 ** 
supplier Credit from suppliers and advances 
from customers 
13.03 9.72 10.52  
informal Moneylenders, friends, relatives, etc. 2.99 3.48 6.32 *** 
Access to Finance     
difficulty Degree of difficulty in gaining access to 
finance 
1.37 1.28 1.31  
Note: The asterisks, *, **, and ***, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys, multiple years.  
To understand firms’ relationships with banks, we look at credit lines and working 
capital loans. WOFs have a lower share of both overdraft facilities and loans. The gap 
also exists in working capital. On average, the working capital funded by banks is lower 
for woman-owned exporters, at 16% versus 19%. While this suggests that male-owned 
firms have a better relationship with the bank, we also see that WOFs have fewer 
difficulties in gaining access to other financial institutions and informal financing 
resources such as moneylenders, friends, relatives, etc.  
Overall, there are gender gaps in the borrower-lender relationship. But we cannot 
conclude that woman-owned exporters are more prone to being rationed by banks 
simply because of their gender. This is in line with other findings in the literature, 
though the results reported in the literature are not consistent. In a study of loan 
renewals for small businesses owned by white women or minorities, Asiedu et al. 
(2012) find that businesses owned by white women do not face higher rejection rates 
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on loan renewals (i.e., once the lender has information about them from a previous 
period).3 However in a study of credit to micro-sized firms, Alesina et al. (2013) find that 
even after controlling for firm characteristics, women paid more for overdraft facilities.  
3.2 Exclusion Level II: Access to Finance for Trade 
Once a firm becomes competitive and productive enough, it may transition from 
servicing only the domestic market to selling internationally. However, this move 
requires capital – not only to find buyers and learn how to meet international quality 
standards, but also to finance trade. If a firm is unknown, the buyer will require an 
intermediary to finance and guarantee the transaction – this is the main function of 
trade finance.  
Trade finance is a bank-intermediated instrument facilitating cross-border commerce. 
Although it has short-term, self-liquidating, and low-risk features, the approval of an 
application is still influenced by the riskiness of the firm. Banks may treat male- and 
woman-owned enterprises differently due to their creditworthiness (Agier and Szafarz 
2013). The difference between the two groups might suggest that women-led 
enterprises face more obstacles in the credit market. But gender does not necessarily 
impact the decision-making of banks. 
The idea of a second level of discrimination is related to the fact that firms that are 
applying for trade finance already have a banking relationship. Thus, the role of 
information asymmetry should play less of a role. Our approach to this question is most 
closely related to a study by Asiedu et al. (2013), who looked at loan renewal 
applications. The idea was that for renewals, banks already had information about 
borrowers and would not reject based on information asymmetries. They found this 
was true for women but not for many minority-owned firm groups.  
We use two waves of the ADB Company Survey on Trade Finance. The 2016 wave 
includes 791 companies from 98 countries, while the 2017 wave includes 1336 firms 
from 103 countries. The majority of the firms are small and medium-sized and one-third 
are in the manufacturing sector. Approximately half of them are woman-owned 
businesses, which are mostly micro and small enterprises. Table 3 details where 
woman-owned firms stand apart.  
Table 3: Gender Characteristics of Trade Finance 
Variables Description MLFs WLFs Mean Difference 
Apply If applied for TF 0.50 0.47 0.03 
No need If TF is required for trade activity  0.43 0.37 0.06* 
Discouraged If TF is required but did not apply 0.08 0.18 –0.10*** 
Rationed If rejection rate > 0 0.74 0.87 –0.14*** 
TF Gap Rejection rate 34.91 45.45 –10.54*** 
The asterisks, *, **, and ***, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Source: ADB trade finance survey 2016 and 2017. 
  
3  It is important to note that the “woman” category is restricted to include only white women. Minority 
women would have been slotted into minority-owned business categories.  
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The share of total business relying on trade is higher for WOFs, which accordingly 
require more trade finance. Applications for trade finance were equally distributed 
among gender groups. However, women-led firms are 10% more likely to be 
discouraged. In other words, they need trade finance but do not apply for it. This 
confirms the results shown in the credit discrimination literature (e.g., Freel et al. 2012).  
Trade finance shortfalls arise when firms have insufficient collateral and a weak 
relationship with the banking sector, and lack bank trust. The gap increases when  
the exporter is a woman. Almost 87% of trade finance transactions are rationed for 
women exporters, compared with male entrepreneurs who are 14% lower. Among  
the reasons for denial, female exporters are more often rejected due to insufficient 
collateral or no past relationship with financial institutions. Also, application 
documentation is more important for female exporters in obtaining trade finance. This is 
probably because incomplete and unacceptable documents may influence a bank’s 
perception of the enterprise.  
Table 4: Reasons for Rejection in Trade Finance 
Variables MLFs WLFs Mean Difference 
Insufficient collateral 0.25 0.42 –0.17*** 
Poor documentation 0.09 0.16 –0.07*** 
No past relation with banks 0.20 0.22 –0.02 
Insufficient credit history 0.06 0.17 –0.10*** 
High country risk 0.11 0.12 –0.01 
AML/KYC 0.03 0.03 0.01 
The asterisks, *, **, and ***, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Source: ADB trade finance survey 2016 and 2017. 
3.3 Informal and Fintech 
Let’s take a deeper look at this second level of exclusion, and what it means for firms. 
We know that woman-owned firms and SMEs are more likely to be rejected by formal 
financial institutions. But there are other ways of financing a trade transaction.  
Self-financing is one, friends and family (informal) is another.  
Once a trade transaction is rejected by a bank, the data show that 41% of all surveyed 
firms seek alternative sources of finance either in the formal or informal sector. 
Woman-owned firms are about 10% more likely to seek alternative financing. However, 
while male-led firms are more likely to find formal sources of financial alternatives, 
woman-led firms are more likely to identify informal sources of finance. A third of WOFs 
report using informal financial providers.  
While fintech is not specified as an “alternative,” there is a separate question about the 
use of fintech by trading firms. According to the 2017 survey, 38% of firms that use 
fintech also use bank finance. This suggests that it is being used by these firms as a 
diversification strategy or to supplement insufficient trade finance. Among users of 
fintech, in 2017, most (77%) are woman-owned firms. This result is in the same 
direction as the 2016 survey year.  
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Table 5: Usage of Informal Finance 
Dep. Var.: Digital User (1) (2) (3) 
femaleown 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.36** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.15) 
foreign  0.27 1.02*** 
  (0.22) (0.27) 
firmsize  –0.13** –0.15* 
  (0.05) (0.09) 
rejectionrate   0.00 
   (0.00) 
insufficient collateral   0.15 
   (0.24) 
poordoc   0.05 
   (0.20) 
no bank relation   0.29* 
   (0.17) 
poor credit history   0.33* 
   (0.20) 
high country risk   –0.22 
   (0.22) 
amlkyc   0.32 
   (0.39) 
Constant –0.69*** –0.51*** –0.90** 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.36) 
Country level income Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 960 959 330 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
The asterisks, *, **, and ***, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
4. EVIDENCE OF SUPPLY-SIDE DISCRIMINATION 
The above sections have shown that woman-owned enterprises are unconditionally 
less likely to obtain bank finance and face higher rejection rates. But the underlying 
drivers of these shortfalls are still in question. To explore this issue, we empirically 
assess whether the gender gap still exists when controlling for a firm’s characteristics. 
There are two parts to this question. The first is whether there is a gender-specific 
component to banks’ rejections of women-owned firms’ applications for trade finance. 
But there are other ways to obtain finance. Fintech, for example, is rapidly gaining 
attention as a way to finance SMEs that fall into the finance gap. Favoring SMEs might 
also indirectly favor women. In the second part of this section, we look at the literature 
to see whether it supports the idea that there is positive discrimination for women-
owned firms in fintech.  
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4.1 Are Banks Rejections Based on Gender? 
The access gap that exists between women- and male-led firms on the aggregate level 
narrows with productivity and firm size. In Table 3, we saw that women-led firms face 
rejection rates for trade finance that are about 10% larger than men. But this does not 
control for the types of firms that are run by women.  
Table 6: Gender and Trade Finance 
 Prob (Application) Rejection Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
wlf –0.05 –0.11 0.03 15.84*** 12.84*** 6.68 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (4.66) (4.42) (4.62) 
logsale  0.03 0.06***  –3.35*** –2.59*** 
  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.95) (0.82) 
foreign  0.01 0.11  21.98** 21.07** 
  (0.23) (0.23)  (10.12) (9.07) 
firmsize  0.04 0.10  –4.75 –2.94 
  (0.06) (0.08)  (3.18) (2.66) 
insufficient collateral   0.32***   27.54*** 
   (0.09)   (4.44) 
poordoc   0.13   5.12 
   (0.15)   (6.09) 
no bank relation   0.01   12.32*** 
   (0.15)   (4.43) 
poor credit history   0.33***   15.58** 
   (0.11)   (6.92) 
high country risk   0.13   10.46* 
   (0.14)   (6.25) 
amlkyc   –0.28   –18.86 
   (0.29)   (12.16) 
constant 0.48*** 0.11 –0.38 40.83*** 91.92*** 56.76*** 
 (0.16) (0.27) (0.33) (8.29) (12.04) (12.39) 
Country income level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 1,065 902 637 366 320 309 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
The asterisks, *, **, and ***, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
To test how gender would affect the attainability of trade finance conditional on firm 
characteristics, we estimate the following regression: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝑿𝑖𝛼1 + 𝒁𝒊𝛼2 + 𝜖𝑖 
where 𝑌𝑖 denotes either firm 𝑖’s demand for trade finance or the result of application. 
Demand is measured as a dichotomous indicator that takes the value of one when the 
i-th firm applies for trade finance and zero otherwise. The result of application is 
captured by the proportion of rejected requests.  𝑿𝑖 is a vector of controls, comprising 
firm size, annual sales, and reasons for being rationed. The reasons are dummy 
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variables, including insufficient collateral or guarantee, unsoundness of the proposal, 
inability to fulfill all documentation requirements, the lack of a business relationship  
with financial institutions, a poor company record, high-risk country rating, and banks’ 
AML/KYC requirements. Country-level characteristics are captured by  𝑍𝑖 . A probit 
model is used to examine the likelihood of application between gender groups. Note 
that 20% of the applicants were not rationed, i.e., zero rejection rate. Taking account of 
zeros, we use a Tobit model to assess the impact of ownership on rejection. 
We might expect that among exporters – who all have access to a bank and are among 
the most competitive firms – this gap would be negligible. However, even among the 
most productive WLF exporters, a gap remains in their access to trade finance, which 
is a critical enabler of trade. 
On the other hand, there is a statistically significant difference in access to financial 
institutions between exporters and domestic firms. When comparing women-led 
exporters with their male-led counterparts, little gap is found in access to financial 
institutions. This finding indicates that access to financial institutions in general is more 
likely to depend on firms’ characteristics, especially whether they are exporters or 
importers, rather than gender effects.  
4.2 Do Fintech Providers Prefer to Lend to Women? 
The question about fintech uptake among women-owned firms is one that has received 
almost no attention in the literature. The work that has been done focuses on the 
lending side rather than the borrower side. In addition, outcomes are mixed. Since we 
focus on P2P lending in this paper, we look into that literature specifically. Because 
users of P2P lending platforms face considerable information asymmetry between 
borrowers and lenders, one of the central research questions of recent studies is what 
factors influence a lender’s behavior and what contributes towards making bidders 
more or less successful on the platform. 
Most studies of P2P lending use US or European data and find no evidence that the 
gender of the borrowers affects lender behavior (see, for example, Herzenstei et al. 
2008; Barasinska and Schäfer 2010; Barasinska 2011). However, there is also 
evidence that the physical appearance of borrowers increased their likelihood of 
obtaining a loan (Ravina 2008), and of paying less interest (Pope and Sydnor 2011).  
Studies looking at PRC-based P2P platforms are also mixed. Chen et al. (2013) found 
that female borrowers were less likely to be funded, while Feng et al. (2015) found  
that lenders preferred both female borrowers and older borrowers. Thus, from existing 
work, we cannot conclude that the supply side of fintech has a strong gender 
differential.  
Although our findings demonstrate that fintech plays more of a role for WOFs than it 
does for firms that are owned by men, more research is needed to understand this 
relationship. What is clear is that such alternative finance options have become part of 
the solution to ensuring that this underserved exporting population’s financing needs 
are met. 
What does this mean for trade finance? It remains to be seen how traditional trade 
finance will respond to the challenge of digital financing in serving the needs of its 
borrowers. Already, institutional investors, corporates, and banks are experimenting 
with online platforms, crowdfunding, and peer-to-peer or marketplace lending. It is clear 
that the importance of digital financing is being recognized. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
To answer the questions posed in the introduction, we employed two different data sets 
that offered insight into the experience women traders face in accessing the finance 
they need to export. Our objective was to extend the literature on access to finance and 
the importance of financial characteristics of a firm. Financial health positively impacts 
the probability of being an exporter (Berman and Hericourt 2010), while credit rationing 
greatly decreases it (Minetti and Zhu 2011); liquidity improves the number of new 
export destinations (Forlani 2010), while financially dependent firms have lower export 
growth rates (Bricongne et al. 2012).  
Questions about gender discrimination in credit access are nothing new (see e.g., 
Buttner and Rosen 1988; Coleman 2000). But exploration of the secondary level of 
discrimination for traders is.  
We confirm that woman-owned firms face greater barriers to access to finance than the 
general population. This occurs first at the level of basic access to finance. The ADB 
data further show that women exporters own firms with characteristics that lead to 
rejection of their trade finance applications even though they have secured a banking 
relationships. The data show that this is driven by the characteristics common to firms 
owned by women.  
This suggests two policy points. First, trade facilitation efforts can incorporate gender 
goals by targeting firms with the characteristics common to woman-owned firms. 
Second, requiring banks to lend to women may not solve the access problem. Lending 
practices incorporate collateral deposits and credit assessments that these firms have 
difficulty meeting. A more effective policy would be to reconsider how credit 
assessment is done – for example, using some of the practices increasingly common in 
the fintech space. In terms of collateral, moveable assets can be considered to which 
women-led firms are more likely to have access.  
We also raise the issue of whether technology-enabled finance is the solution to 
underserved exporting populations. This has gained a great deal of attention since the 
global financial crisis. But there is limited evidence to support this. Most available 
research focuses on what influences the behavior of lenders. In contrast, our analysis 
highlights gender patterns in exporting firms’ engagement with fintech. WOFs are more 
likely to use fintech platforms to obtain finance, after being rejected by traditional banks 
for trade finance.  
The bottom line is that trading firms owned by women face additional hurdles in 
financing their exports. The main problem is not access to a financial institution – all the 
firms in this study are banked – but rather securing capital with the existing resources 
at their disposal. Looking through this lens, it is no surprise that woman-owned firms 
seek alternatives more aggressively after rejection and are more likely to secure capital 
through a fintech platform. This suggests that the novel credit assessment mechanisms 
we see coming out of the fintech sector may be a reasonable starting point for 
extending access to trade finance among this population. 
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APPENDIX 
Summary of Literature on P2P Lending and Gender 
Authors 
Name of  
Article 
P2P 
Lending 
Platform  
Analyzed Findings 
Herzenstei, 
Andrews, 
Dholakia, 
and 
Lyandres 
(2008) 
The democratization 
of personal consumer 
loans? Determinants 
of success in online 
peer-to-peer lending 
communities 
Prosper.com 
(US) 
• Did not find gender to have a powerful effect on 
Prosper.com lenders. 
• P2P lending platforms are more democratic and less 
discriminatory then traditional platforms.  
• Most influential variables were the amount of 
personal information borrowers provided and their 
credit grades. 
Ravina 
(2008)  
Love & loans: The 
effect of beauty and 
personal 
characteristics in 
credit markets 
Prosper.com 
(US) 
• Analyze how lenders use information about aspects 
of borrowers’ appearance, such as ethnicity, gender, 
and attractiveness, when lending. 
• Women are more likely to be considered beautiful 
and trustworthy, but, interestingly, not creditworthy, 
• The beautiful receive favorable treatment in this 
market.  
Pope and 
Sydnor 
(2011)  
What’s in the picture? 
Evidence of 
discrimination from 
Prosper.com 
Prosper.com 
(US) 
• Single women pay 0.4% less interest than men even 
though the estimated return on loans to single 
women is approximately 2 percentage points less 
than for single men.  
• Significant racial discrimination. Listings with black 
people in the picture are 2.4–3.2 percentage points 
less likely to be funded. 
Barasinska 
and Schäfer 
(2010) 
Does gender affect 
funding success in the 
peer-to-peer credit 
markets? Evidence 
from the largest 
German lending 
platform 
Smava.de 
(Germany) 
• Gender does not affect borrowers’ chances of 
funding success.  
• Gender discrimination is linked to platform-specific 
phenomena rather than a common attribute of P2P 
credit markets. 
Barasinska 
(2011) 
Does gender affect 
investors’ appetite for 
risk? Evidence from 
peer-to-peer 
Smava.de. 
(Germany) 
• No evidence of gender differences in investors’ risk 
propensity. 
• Significant gender differences in investors’ tastes 
are found only with respect to preferred investment 
duration, purpose of investment project, and 
borrowers’ age. 
Chen, Hao, 
and Xu 
(2013) 
Gender discrimination 
towards borrowers in 
online P2P lending 
PPdai.com 
(PRC) 
• Gender was influential. 
• Female borrowers were less likely to be funded than 
male borrowers, although their default rates were 
lower and the authors suspected that this was due to 
prejudice rather than rational reasoning. 
Chen, Li, and 
Lai (2016) 
Gender discrimination 
in online peer-to-peer 
credit lending: 
evidence from a 
lending platform in the 
PRC  
PPdai.com 
(PRC) 
• Found gender discrimination, both in favor and 
against female borrowers.  
• Although the majority of the users were male, female 
borrowers were 33% more likely to be funded than 
male borrowers and were therefore preferred by 
lenders.  
• However, although female borrowers were 52% less 
likely to default on their loan repayments, they still 
had to pay higher interest rates than male 
borrowers. 
Feng, Fan, 
and Yoon 
(2015) 
Lenders’ and 
borrowers’ strategies 
in online peer-to-peer 
lending market: An 
empirical analysis of 
PPDai.com 
PPdai.com 
(PRC) 
• Information related to a borrower’s credit is very 
influential. 
• Both gender and age also matter to lenders.  
• Lenders prefer both female borrowers and older 
borrowers, over the age of 31.  
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